Né en1945 à Kaluga (Russie), Mykhailo Kirsenko a étudié à l'Université Tarass Chevtchenko de Kiev où il a obtenu une licence d'histoire, avec spécialisation dans les rapports internationaux. Il a étudié avec une attention particulière l'histoire des Balkans et de l'Europe Centrale, notamment la Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne.

Il a enseigné dans les Universités de Kiev (chaire des rapports internationaux), de Prague (chaire de sciences politiques), de Londres (chaire des études militaires au Kings College, du Kansas (USA) et dans beaucoup d'autres écoles supérieures.

Il est Vice-Directeur de l'Institut ukrainien pour l'Europe du Centre-Est (à Lviv), membre du Comité national ukrainien pour les études sur l'Europe du Sud-Est, de la Commission polono-ukrainienne des historiens, de la Société Européenne de la Culture.

Conférencier de réputation internationale, Mykhailo Kirsenko est l'auteur de trois ouvrages et de nombreux articles sur l'histoire et la politique, publiés notamment en Allemagne, au Benelux, en France, en Pologne, en Russie, en Suède.

Mykhailo Kirsenko est le fondateur de la chaire d'histoire à l'Académie Mohyla de Kiev et de la chaire de la politique étrangère et du droit international à l'Académie Diplomatique auprès du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'Ukraine.

Il nous livre une vision historique des questions de sécurité et des causes majeures des conflits dans les Balkans post-communistes.

I would like to express my gratitude to our conference organisers for such a privilege and pleasure to take part in all the Coudenhove-Kalergi meetings. I am sure that they become even more important with every passing year because of the complexity of problems that Europe is facing now.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia put an end to the epoch of multinational realms (States) in Europe, but the problems inherited from the past did not disappear automatically. On the contrary, while the West is quickly moving from l'Europe des patries towards interregional co-operation and integration, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe are still too far from such an ideal. Patriotic self-consciousness could play a very positive role forming le citoyen du monde in the European Union (EU). On the other hand, some old xenophobic prejudices stimulated destructive isolation, mutual accusation, ethnoreligious hostility and territorial clashes outside EU, however, close to its borders. Indivisibility and vulnerability of the World make the most influential Powers feel responsible for the peace-making efforts even not popular.

The 50^th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty was marked with seemingly contradictive events : three new member States joining the Alliance, and its intervention in Yugoslavia aimed to stop the genocide. All attempts of Serbian rulers to restore their Federation or to keep it together by brutal force failed completely. The violence just fastened and made irreversible separation of the sister republics making a reconciliation between them more difficult. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and even Montenegro are drifting though with different speed to NATO, as the only reliable guarant of safety. Hungary and Poland, a former God's Playground, have found stability within the framework of Euro-Atlantic structures. Slovakia, after a civilised divorce with the Czechs, is following them to reunification in the European House.

The post-Communist part of Europe can be divided into three subregions that historically corresponded to the spheres of German, Russian and Ottoman influence. The first one consists of Estonia and Latvia (former Ostseeland), Lithuania and Poland (ex-Commonwealth of Both Nations, including its Jewish town communities), the Czech Lands (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia), Croatia, Slovenia and some Danubian countries (Hungary, Slovakia and partly Romania). They had long experience of living in the multinational units with the considerable measure of local autonomy, especially in the Austrian Cisleitania with its parliamentary flexibility. More important, neither ex-Russian Poland nor the Baltics had been constituent parts of the Soviet Union during the inter-war Great Terror, so their intellectual and human resources could not be destroyed so completely.

Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius stopped to be Russian possessions de facto at the same time as Warsaw and Helsinki. They continue their only Statehood experience, before the Soviet annexation during World War II. The Nazi occupation and Soviet satellite regimes did not manage to smash historical memory. Despite the hard failures (Hungarian revolution, Prague Spring, Polish risings, Baltic deportations), the peoples survived and kept their identity. When the gerontocratic Stagnation led the Socialist camp to an end, they all quickly returned to Europe with all its duties and privileges. The efforts to achieve a full-fledged membership in the North-Atlantic defensive structure are one of a few issues of national consensus in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Their neighbours, the former Warsaw Pact States, will follow as soon as Brussels agrees to admit them.

The second subregion encompasses European Russia, Moldova and most of Belarus with no Statehood tradition of their own since the Middle Ages. In the Russian Empire, they never had a special status unlike the Grand Duchy of Finland, the Polish Kingdom, or the Baltic Lands. Autocratic domination required a centralist assimilation, but Western and Southern (the Caucasus and Central Asia) fringes were touched with it later, while the Orthodox Church areas were regarded as an object of Russification. After the October revolution, any self-identity was suppressed and the Soviet peoples had to disappear in an artificial Russian-speaking nationless society. Russia, Belarus and Moldova are involved in the political clashes (attempts at totalitarian restoration, anti-NATO moods, Neo-Panslavism, separatism, imperial and Communist nostalgy).

Yesterday we had with some participants an interesting discussion about Russia with some participants. I will just mention a couple of words before coming to the Balkans. The Russians can be excellent people, but they do not behave, do not think, do not feel as Europeans. Their political mentality actually is based on the greatness, on the historical rights, while these principles are more or less alien to contemporary European political mentality. Russia is a multinational State like, for instance, China or India. Moreover, the Russians do not identify themselves with the Europeans. They use to talk about Great Russia and (not in) Europe. A proposition made to spread Russia until the Chinese See or to divide Russia by the Ural Mountains could hardly get the approval of Moscow.

The situation in the former Soviet Union is complicated. Current events in Moscow are better known in the West, while other ex-Soviet nations remain in the shadow, though their trends are worthy to speak about. Belarus has been strongly Russified, its self-preservation was exhausted by the Bolshevik purges, and the only precedent of a Statehood could be found in the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Minsk accepted an ambitious demagogue exploiting populist slogans to cover his errors behind a Slavic unity curtain. (This unity, by the way, excludes most Slavs in Central Europe and Balkans.) However, a nation-wide collective farm can hardly re-unite with market-oriented Russia. Tatarstan and other autonomous units could use a privileged Belarus status as a pretext to claim new rights. An attempt to play a similar card in Moldova is fruitless as it is close to Romania, with no common frontier with Russia.

The Balkan lands are the third zone : Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, the remnant Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia, with de facto independent Kosova and polyethnic Vojvodina). They were following the East-European evolution till the late Middle Ages when the whole of the Peninsula was captured and subjugated by the Ottoman Turks. Greece also belonged to this subregion and influenced its culture, but its predominantly Mediterranean economic and geopolitical orientation had to play a decisive role in making it at last as a NATO member State. (That trend of Greece as a Balkan country drifting westward can be compared to the former Russian Kingdom of Poland that de facto did not differ essentially from the situation in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine till the first decades of the 20^th century).

The Ottoman possessions avoided any direct impacts of European Renaissance and Baroque, religious Reformation and Enlightenment. The highlanders kept archaic clan traditions, and absorbed a lot of Muslim values. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia-Dalmacia-Slovinia, the Danubian Principalities (Moldova and Valachia), Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Transylvania used to be a moving frontier area between Christianity and Islam. The Austrian and Russian troops were step by step pushing off the Ottomans back, out of Europe. Sometimes it depended just on a personal point of view, whether to regard local guerrilla fighters as the separatist gangs of rebels and robbers, or the patriots and partisans of liberation movement against the infidels. Many generations used to justify their violence with such noble motives.

Having jumped from Asia to Europe as a result of popular struggle and Turkish military defeats, the peasant nations survived the monarchist autocracy, class struggle and painful looking for a liberal model of their own. It was complicated by foreign interventions and mutual accusations in collaboration with occupants, as the Great Powers were interested in strategic resources and communications. A mixture of totalitarian and other chauvinist ideologies (the Bulgarian claims to Macedonia, a vision of homogeneous Croatian State, Pan-Hellenic Mehali Idea, Hungarian dreams of the Crown of St. Stephen territorial integrity with Slovakia and Transylvania, Romanian claims to the whole of Bukovina and Bessarabia, assimilative Yugoslavism) contributed to the general tension with stimulates suspicions, deep mistrust and hatred.

One should neither overestimate nor neglect religious antagonisms. It is much more of a political than of a dogmatic character reflecting also social contrasts and competition. The Catholic Croats, the Orthodox Serbs, the Muslim Bosnians belonged to different civilisations, so their mentality is overburdened with historical memory. However, they managed to co-exist peacefully unless a dirty Armed Propaganda was unleashed by the chauvinists. In the past, a Church partition (e.g. between the Bulgarian Exarchate and Greek Patriarchate) was used as a precedent for ethnic definition and territorial claims during the Balkanisation of the European Turkey. Another example can be found in the struggle for the recognition of the national identity for certain ethnic groups (e.g. Bosnians or Bosnian Serbs, Macedonians or Macedonian Bulgarians).

Two names could be applied for the same area (as Greek North Epyrus for South Albania), and linguistic criteria run counter self-consciousness, when the mother tongue did not correspond to the national identification. The Balkan alliances and wars were not able to solve conflicts but to complicate them furthermore. A multinational experiment of Yugoslavia collapsed in spite of its renaming and remaking (from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes till a Socialist Federation). An old joke about socialist Yugoslavia mentioned that it was a State of six republics, five peoples, four languages, three religions, two alphabets and one ruling party.

The Republic of Macedonia has problems because Athens refused to recognise its legal right to have the same name as a Greek province. (Similar situations elsewhere provoke no conflict : Luxemburg does not protest that Belgium has a region with the same name.) The status of minorities is a source of tension (the Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians in Transylvania and Vojvodina).

The cynical selfishness of neo-Slavist militant propaganda could be seen recently when the Greater Serbia partisans unanimously voted at the Parliament to join a Union of Russia and Belarus, but they forgot it as soon as the NATO bombardment of Belgrade was over. The firm resolution of USA and its allies during the conflict of Kosova was a decisive factor of the victory against the atrocities of the last Balkan dictatorship. While Albanians signed a compromise agreement, Serbs chose the war (I mean not Serbian people but the regime of Milosevic). Having suffered from the ethnic cleaning, expel and massacres, the Kosovars deserved independence as a legitimate right of self-determination in conformity with the International Law. The Yugoslav Federation is disintegrated definitely (and attempts to save its integrity by force were as hopeless as to keep Russian rule in Lithuania, Georgia or Chechnya).

Albanians are to display their vitality, since fratricidal competition can weaken the liberation movement, and political power can be legitimised only through fair elections. The interim international protectorate is an approach to save peace provided the local population will be co-operative. The establishment of democracy does not exclude an assistance of the European Council or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The success in the construction of a civil society and a free market economy will be the decisive factor for a finale status definition. The democratic irreversible transformation of Serbia cannot be expected as long as Kosova is regarded as its part, even if all the war criminals would be sent to the Hague Tribunal. Confidence must be built between Albanians and Serbs through the development of reciprocal respect.

The Albanians' behaviour and tolerance to the Serb minority after the war is crucial, and good bilateral relations indispensable for long term stability. The key hangs in the changes of the nation building philosophy. They are needed in the politics but also in social institutions. A strong belief and hope exist for that conflict to be the last but not the latest one in the region. It is expected to put an end to the trend for a State projecting its own prosperity by dominating another nationality. The bloodshed accompanied the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, and it should encourage deep and major change in the region as a whole. The Balkans, even today, still present a chain of weak States demanding to strengthen their liberal and market economy structures. Being neglected this will put into doubt the future of peace and stability.

The viability of the Republic of Macedonia depends on the peaceful co-operation between the Macedonians and Albanians in their joint State with firm guaranties for ethnic cultures. Montenegro State institutions and public opinion reflected a good will to join democratic values and the international efforts. The future of Montenegro is to be encouraged in keeping good neighbour ties with Serbia, but more important, in close engagement with the community of all European States. Albania demonstrated an impressive positive image during the crisis, and its stability strengthening is necessary in broad dimensions. The region should not be held a hostage by the regime in Belgrade. If it survives in power, Serbia can be temporarily excluded from reconstruction with a choice : either preserving the status quo, or inclusion into international life.

The religion is facing two possible streams of development. An optimistic prognosis envisages consistent reforms. Their successful implementation has a chance through the regular elections, stable governments, consolidation of democratic institutions, public confidence, marginalisation of the extremists advocating authoritarianism, and strict control of police and security forces. Economic progress and credible programs must serve both domestic and regional purposes. More emphasis has to be placed on the networks serving to enhance initiatives. Civil society should include all its components : media, interest groups, non-governmental organisations and protection for minority rights. A strategy for the organised crime and corruption fighting is to be devised by each State in tandem with its neighbours. Politically connected crime remains a priority in this aspect.

A pessimistic alternative would be series of domestic crisis, accompanied by fundamental political and economic breakdown. Resurgent authoritarianism, social paralysis and populist upsurge are among the negative ingredients. However, the Balkans have indeed a unique opportunity for revival and modernisation. NATO's presence in Kosova as a crucial component of the peace keeping forces and their umbrella is indispensable to guarantee safety in short coming future. The progress is aimed at the compatibility with the World standards and meeting the main parameters. An effective aid would be focused above all on the private investments, rather than a State assistance to avoid duplication and a squandering of resources. European integration looks as the best therapy for this region to develop, produce less problems and reflect more values.

The biggest nation of the coherent region between Germany and Russia, with its crucial geopolitical position, can hardly be put just in one of three zones mentioned above. Ukraine has no global ambitions of a superpower, yet it is the sixth largest European country, and the only one with all peculiar features and phenomenae of East-Central Europe, just partly represented in the other lands. It has predominantly Slavic population with Turkish, Hungarian, Jewish, Germanic, Romanian, Greek minorities. The Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Uniate Churches co-exist with Islam and Judaism. The culture was marked with Renaissance, Baroque, Classicism, Romanticism, Modernism and other European impacts. Ukrainian lands belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman and Russian/Soviet Empires, and their client States.

Ukraine shared the faith of her neighbours, there was almost no difference between Russian Kiev and Warsaw, or between Austrian Lviv (Lemberg) and Krakov. Just under the soviet rule the nation perished as victim of the terror, forced labour, mass murders, manmade famines, deportations, genocide, ethnocide and ecocide. Its national rebirth on the wave of popular movement was not a matter of an option, but of physical survival. Ukraine managed to keep internal peace with the normal transition of power after president elections, and it is the unique example of nuclear self-disarmament. But to avoid violence at any price, Ukraine did not remove influential nomenklatura clans from their positions in the government and business. Having changed colours, they are indifferent to any civic duties, involved in corruption, and not able to introduce consistent market reforms.

Ukrainian democrats had no experience in administration and economics. Any country has to overcome social and economic crisis during the transition, but ineffectiveness of ex-Soviet militarised industry and collapse of the collective farming aggravated unemployment and poverty. The disappointment with the failure of sweat dreams about prosperity after emancipation was misused by so called Left forces. (The real Ukrainian socialists were preventively exterminated at the inter-war Great Terror together with all supposed class enemies. Since then, the Communist party of Ukraine was just a CPSU territorial branch, so unlike their comrades in Russia, the Communists and crypto-Communists in Ukraine have no alternative program for national development but the State self-liquidation, a national suicide).

An Ancien Régime restoration with no realistic program and financing is destined to failure, but some slogans and sweet promises of cheap social security look attractively for the aged people as more active electorate, while the young generation underestimates that danger. It is far from a nightmarish image of a Weimar Russia, so such a phantom seemingly can not threaten peace with a conquest as aggressive trends are turned inside. But a left government could offer just short-lived populist measures as emission (and inflation). A conflict with the West and the lack of sources for recovery would lead to a witch-hunt and the tension in a country with nuclear power-plants. The policy makers and experts pay now more attention to the Balkans, however it is reasonable to regard East-Central Europe as a whole with Kiev as one of its cornerstones.

It is still important to have a stronghold of stability to check Russia from re-transformation into an Empire and to promote equality of relations of Kiev with Moscow and Warsaw. Faced with a Russian mass-culture pressure, the people feel defenceless without a support given to their native languages and cultures at schools, media, etc. It has to be protected and co-ordinated on the large scale in the well-financed international co-operation to overcome a faceless Homo Sovieticus complex of inferiority. The task is to reveal the truth of Soviet equality of fear and poverty, and to draw prospects of the Open Society advantages that the common people feel winners and not losers as a Free World nation. The best argument in favour of the Western values could be visible prosperity in the areas where they had been adopted more quickly.

After disappearance of enormous credits in Moscow, eventual investors or humanitarian aid distributors should carefully select partners. The Western part of Ukraine can more painlessly move up closer to the Central European level, and it would be an example for the rest of the country to follow the same way. The French, Germans or Scandinavians are Europeans because of the preserving of their identity, so the protection for the native languages and cultures is conformed to the interests of the International Community. It is better to get new human resources instead of hungry and angry neighbours. Economic and political reform will provide prosperity for the citizens and integrate the country with the outside world. So an independent, secure, democratic and prosperous Ukraine is a key position in the architecture of the new Europe. As France helped Germany to re-join the rest of Europe after the Second World War, and Germany helped Poland after the Cold War, so now Poland has the same preconditions to play a similar role towards Ukraine, while the West Ukraine could play the same role for the rest of the country.

While the West developed on the base of national consolidation, the State building in East-Central Europe was characterised predominantly by imperial disintegration. In both cases it resulted in destructive conflicts, if territorial and other claims were aggravated with ethnic chauvinism aimed at suppression of smaller nations. At present a nation's European identity is determined not by a geographic position, not by considerations of Greatness or historical rights, but by her readiness to follow certain clear modus vivendi, a complex of obligations as respect and protection for human rights. It includes the right to self-identity of each person, ethnic and confessional community unless it does not threaten general peace. The final result of integration should be similar in the East as in the West : a strong, peaceful and prosperous Europe of regions, of nations, of its people for the benefit of the mankind. The example of Switzerland can be a very good proof for optimism in this regard.

Earlier or later, all the post-Communist nations of East-Central Europe will come to the civilised life as the only alternative to the destruction. Modern technologies are powerful but dangerous weapons to play with at the expense of others. If a nation has not to adopt some unknown democratic values in its mentality, but to restore them in her historic memory and to accommodate to the present situation, the transition would be easier for such a country and less expensive for the whole of international community. The contemporary World indivisibility looks especially obvious in the heart of Europe, a common cradle of our cultural and intellectual heritage. And self-sacrificed activity of Paneurope Suisse in the cause of European integration surely deserves our special gratitude for so valuable efforts to promote achievement of that excellent goal.